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The question that I have offered as the subtitle of this essay is 
one that German philosopher Jürgen Habermas felt personally 
obliged to answer in an essay entitled Morality and Ethical Life: 
Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics.1 There, 
Habermas acknowledges the great degree of similarity between 
his discourse ethics and Kant's moral philosophy.2 He also ac-
cepts the cogency of Hegel's criticisms of Kant. He rejects, 
however, the idea that Hegel's critique applies to discourse ethics. 
After a brief exposition of discourse ethics, Habermas identifies 
what he understands to be the key points of similarity and differ-
ence between his theory and Kant's. Then he explains the degree 
to which four of Hegel's most trenchant criticisms of Kant apply to 
discourse ethics.3 He claims, "Hegel's objections apply less to the 
reformulations of Kantian ethics itself than to a number of result-
ing problems that discourse ethics cannot be expected to resolve in 
a single stroke."4 Habermas argues that the problems with dis-
course ethics do not stem from its justification but rather its 
application. He professes a firm belief in the ability of moral argu-
mentation to produce a political situation in which the competing 
aims of individual rights and solidarity are realized. 
The general aim of this essay is to respond to Habermas and to 
reexamine the Hegelian idea that the issues of justification and 
application cannot really be separated. In what follows, I will re-
view the similarities that Habermas acknowledges between 
discourse ethics and Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I will argue 
that the differences that Habermas sees between himself and Kant 
are inessential. Habermas' rethinking of the universalist project 
does not move it beyond Kant in any fundamental way. Finally, I 
will argue that discourse ethics, despite Habermas' protests, is just 
as susceptible to Hegelian critique as Kant's moral philosophy. 
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I 
Habermas uses the adjectives deontological, cognitivist, for-
malist and universalist to describe the most general features of 
discourse ethics.5 Each of these terms can be applied with equal 
veracity to the Kantian moral world-view.6 Both Kantianism and 
discourse ethics are deontological insofar as each of them requires 
the moral agent to appeal to a general rule in order to determine the 
legitimacy of any particular rule. For Kant, if I wish to know 
whether or not I ought to take the maxim "do not lie" as the basis 
for some action of mine (e.g. explaining to my wife where I have 
been or completing my taxes), I must authenticate it by determin-
ing whether or not it is consistent with my recognition of the 
freedom of all other rational beings. I must be able to will that any 
maxim upon which I base my actions ought to become universal 
law.7 In Habermas' discourse ethics, normative validity claims (i.e. 
moral maxims) are legitimized by evaluating them according to 
principle U. Principle U states, "All affected can accept the conse-
quences and the side effects its (i.e. the moral proposition in 
question) general observance can be anticipated to have for the 
satisfaction of everyone's interests." 8 Habermas asserts that U 
bridges the gaps between the interests of the participants in a moral 
discourse. The various normative validity claims introduced by 
participants in a moral discourse can be redeemed only through 
this general rule. 
Another feature that discourse ethics and Kant's practical phi-
losophy share is an emphasis on the cognitive dimension of morality. 
A moral theory is cognitivist if it sets forth an explicit principle of 
justification (e.g. the C.I., or principle U). It must provide an an-
swer to the question of why one moral norm is better than some 
other norm which conflicts with it. Habermas contends that justi-
fication of moral norms is analogous to the justification process 
that goes on in the natural and social sciences when truth claims 
are made.9 The participant in moral argumentation must seek to 
discursively redeem his claim of normative rightness. He must 
provide reasons for his claim and open it to public scrutiny. 
Habermas is careful, however, to observe a strict separation be-
tween the normative and theoretical spheres, which avoids the 
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reduction of ethics to science. He sees such a reduction as charac-
teristic of intuitionsim and value ethics. 1 0 He explains this 
separation into spheres by claiming that theoretical discourse ex-
amines truth claims about the world, while normative discourse 
investigates claims about the lightness of our intersubjectivly con-
structed social arrangements. 
Habermas division follows from Kant's separation of pure and 
practical reason. The clarification of our moral ideas is a cognitive 
process. It is nonetheless different in kind from theoretical cogni-
tion because of its different subject matter." For Kant, science 
rationally investigates the realm of nature and requires sensible 
intuitions while ethics investigates the realm of freedom a priori. 
The congnativist nature of Kant's moral philosophy is clear from 
the subordinate role he ascribes to moral sentiments and his use of 
juridical argumentation. 
In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant provided the ulti-
mate ground for the categorical imperative with a transcendental 
deduction of human freedom.12 His deduction purports to demon-
strate the conditions of the possibility of morality itself. He claims, 
"Every being who cannot act except under the idea of freedom is 
by this alone - from a practical point of view - really free."13 For 
Kant, if an individual is to act with intention, then that individual 
must assume that they themselves are the cause of their actions. 
Not to do so, i.e. to enter into the discussion of morals while main-
taining that one's acts are merely determined, is a contradiction 
between what one asserts and what one's words and actions pre-
suppose. Kant's transcendental deduction of freedom is not 
intended to be a positive proof of human freedom, but rather it is 
merely a defense of freedom analogous to Aristotle's defense of 
the principle of non-contradiction in the Metaphysics.14 Freedom, 
for Kant, is a "fact of reason" insofar as it is the sine qua non of 
morality itself. 
Habermas moves the cognitivist program of justification be-
yond Kant by formulating a comprehensive justification for 
principle U. He attempts to avoid the skeptic's trilema, of infinite 
regress, incomplete deduction, or circular argumentation by ground-
ing his bridging principles in the idea of a performative 
contradiction.15 A semantic contradiction occurs when both some 
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element and its negation are present in the same proposition. A 
performative contradiction, however, occurs when what is expressed 
at the semantic level is in conflict with something that is presup-
posed at the pragmatic level. The statement "I do not exist" is a 
performative contradiction since the very utterance itself presup-
poses the negation of the proposition. Habermas argues that the 
historical critique of universal moral principles like his own, an 
objection he calls the falliballistic objection, necessarily involves 
the objector in a performative contradiction. The objector "has to 
make assumptions that are inevitable in any argumentation game 
aiming at critical examination."16 In order to offer a refutation of 
the cognitivist's claim that he has formulated a universal moral 
principle, the objector must himself employ universal principles 
of communication. This, Habermas asserts, is the foundation of 
the cognitivist program of justification. Principle U is established 
indirectly through the exposure of performative contradictions in 
attempted skeptical refutations of U. 
The fact that the cognitive process of justification of contested 
norms in both Kant and Habermas is carried out according to a 
pre-established procedure makes their views formalist. For Kant, 
when the individual is confronted with a situation that requires 
action he must "begin with principles (the categorical imperative), 
proceed to concepts (moral maxims), and only then, where pos-
sible, from them to the senses (specific action)."17 The construction 
of moral judgments follows a clearly defined series of steps. Kant 
contended that this method of moral reasoning could be taught 
through the use of casuistical questions.18 
Habermas' discourse ethics also establishes a procedure for 
moral argumentation. Habermas articulates this procedure through 
an additional principle, which he refers to as principle D. Prin-
ciple D states "Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet 
(or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity 
as participants in a rational discoursed Whereas principle U 
only laid out the criteria for the acceptance of a contested norm, 
principle D articulates the method of uncovering whether or not 
the norm meets the criteria set out in U. Although Kant's is a rela-
tively simple procedure articulated primarily for use within the 
framework of the daily moral decisions of individuals,20 Habermas 
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offers a sophisticated account of the procedural dimensions of moral 
argumentation which are derived from speech act theory. 
Habermas distinguishes three levels of presuppositions, viz. 
logical, dialectical, and rhetorical, which together form the proce-
dural dimension of discourse ethics.2 1 He claims that these rules of 
argumentation are not constitutive of discourse but that their de-
nial in actual discourse results in a performative contradiction. The 
formalism of discourse ethics is essentially captured in an exhaus-
tive list of ways iii which a participant in a moral argument can 
become involved in a performative contradiction. 
The deontological, cognitivist, and formalist aspects that char-
acterize both Kant's moral thinking and Habermas' discourse ethics 
can be summed up with the term universalist. Universalist ethical 
theories claim to have grounded morality in a manner that is inde-
pendent of both cultural and historical considerations. Kant 
suggested that his practical philosophy arose from the examina-
tion of human nature and that the categorical imperative is simply 
a "fact of reason." Habermas argues similarly that discourse eth-
ics arises from the human capacity for linguistic communication 
and that principle U is a fact of communicative action. Both of 
these universalist principles purport to transcend any specific his-
torical conditions or particular view of the good and to implicitly 
establish themselves as the universal moral theory. 
II. 
I will now take up three specific points of difference between 
discourse ethics and Kant's practical philosophy that Habermas 
identifies. Habermas asserts that discourse ethics is superior to 
Kantianism because it doesn't require Kant's metaphysical postu-
late of the noumenal realm, because it offers social theory of 
morality rather than a monological one, and because it justifies the 
ultimate moral norm in a non-circular way. Habermas believes 
that these crucial differences allow him rectify the problems of the 
Kantian position and to establish the universalist position on wholly 
new ground. 
First, there can be no doubt that Habermas gives up the Kantian 
metaphysical dualism between the empirical world of determinate 
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natural laws and the noumenal realm of laws of freedom. What 
Habermas aims at, following Horkheimer's suggestion, is a "ma-
terialist theory of society."22 He claims, "The unbridgable gap Kant 
saw between the intelligible and the empirical becomes, in dis-
course ethics, a mere tension manifesting itself in everyday 
communication as the factual force of counteifactual presupposi-
tions."23 What Habermas is claiming here is that the dichotomy of 
duty and deed which makes Kant's moral philosophy one where 
only intention matters and the moral worth of an action is only 
determinable by some postulated deity is overcome in discourse 
ethics. This dichotomy is overcome insofar as speech acts are them-
selves actions, but actions that are nonetheless regulated directly 
by the universal principles of moral argumentation. In any attempt 
to redeem a normative validity claim, a speaker attempts to come 
to an understanding with a hearer about some state of affairs in the 
world.2 4 In doing so the speaker leaves himself open to critique. 
Habermas argues that the hearer can directly evaluate whether or 
not the speaker has involved himself in a performative contradic-
tion because both are members of a language community. 
Although Habermas' attempt to distinguish himself from Kant 
succeeds insofar as his theory is situated post-metaphysically, he 
begs the important question of moral judgement no less than Kant. 
Despite the fact that the procedural dimension of discourse ethics 
can be established, at least in an approximate way, prior to any 
actual discourse, this in no way guarantees that the actual discourse 
will conform to those procedures. Even if all participants in a moral 
discourse accept the general rules of moral argumentation, if a situ-
ation arises in which it is unclear to different participants whether 
or not some speaker is involved in a performative contradiction, 
there is no further principle by which to adjudicate that disagree-
ment. 
Habermas would counter the objection that hearers are unable 
to evaluate speaker's normative validity claims directly with his 
conception of intersubjectively established communicative com-
petence.2 5 In The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas 
theorizes, appropriating the view of socialization proposed by 
Mead 2 6 and Wittgenstein's private language argument,2 7 that be-
cause of an individual's socialization into a linguistic community 
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any speaker or hearer already knows the rules of discourse and 
how they are to be applied. The rules of discourse are simply a 
byproduct of the evolution of symbolically mediated interaction to 
the level of grammatical language. Because the rules are situated 
in this evolutionary account they are universal for all language us-
ers. Comunicatively competent speakers and hearers just know how 
the rules of moral argumentation apply because they can commu-
nicate. The formal procedures of moral argumentation described 
in Discourse Ethics are only the inescapable presuppositions of 
any linguistic communication. 
Habermas' conception of communicative competence, how-
ever, begs the same question it was intended to answer in two ways 
depending on how it is argued for. First, if it is asserted that the 
universal rules of moral argumentation are in the process of being 
fully elaborated by moral philosophers, as Habermas occasionally 
does when he refers to "our reconstruction" of the rules, then the 
falliblistic objection reasserts itself with a newfound vigor.21* Par-
ticipants in discourse must, at every turn, ask, "will the 'real' 
universal rules of moral argumentation please stand up?" Second, 
if communicative competence is taken to be the inevitable result 
of socialization, which arises from an inherently social "human 
nature," then problems of the opposite sort arise. Maclntyre has 
identified this argument strategy in several of the chief figures of 
the enlightenment. "These writers (Kant, Hume, Diderot) share in 
the project of constructing valid arguments which will move from 
premises concerning human nature as they understand it to be to 
conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts."29 
Habermas makes the Kantian move of appealing to a "fact of rea-
son" when he invokes the idea of communicative competence in 
this second way. He argues from human nature to moral precepts, 
from the universal capacity to use language to rules governing all 
moral discourse. 
The second major difference between discourse ethics and 
Kant's moral world-view that Habermas observes is that Kant's 
transcendental consciousness merely assumes that it knows the 
general interest in making its moral decisions, while the moral agent 
in discourse ethics leaves this as an open question.3 0 Habermas is 
both right and wrong to distinguish his theory from Kant's. It is 
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true that the formulations of principles U and D move beyond the 
categorical imperative insofar as they incorporate the principle of 
the intersubjectivity of norms in to their very formulation. How-
ever, it is also the case that Habermas' own ideas can be best 
understood as the logical development of post-metaphysical 
Kantianism that is different from Kant not in kind, but only in de-
gree. In order to make the distinction between himself and Kant, 
Habermas must, on one the one hand overlook the degree to which 
Kant's moral philosophy is also a political philosophy and on the 
other, he must conceal the inherent parochialism in his own view. 
Both discourse ethics and Kant's moral philosophy are thor-
oughly political. Moral judgments are not simply matters of 
individual conscience in particular circumstances for Habermas. 
They are social matters to be negotiated in the public sphere. The 
aim of principle U is precisely to work through the conflicts be-
tween competing interests in order to establish collectively valid 
norms. Although Kant distinguishes between private and public 
morality, there is also a clear continuity between his moral and 
political ideals.31 The categorical imperative, though not formu-
lated in a fashion that explicitly calls for a pluralist testing of 
maxims, was nonetheless intended by Kant to serve in that capac-
ity. In his essay Perpetual Peace, Kant offers a vision of the sort 
political arrangements that would be necessary for the public imple-
mentation of the categorical imperative as a principle of 
government. He points out that the C.I. must be the primary con-
sideration for any just sovereign or ruling body.3 2 This sort of 
politics would not, prima facie, require knowledge of human inter-
ests insofar as those interests are already writ large in human nature. 
Habermas objects to what he considers to be a monological 
application of the universal moral principle. The C.I. tells the moral 
agent, be that agent a single person or a governing body only to 
treat other people with the dignity that they deserve as rational 
human beings but it does not provide that agent with any means of 
discovering what the interests of those affected by the adoption of 
some maxim actually are. It simply assumes it knows those inter-
ests (or establishes them a priori which amounts to the same thing). 
Consequently, what it actually means to treat particular individu-
als with respect and dignity remains unclear. According to 
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Habermas, the principle advantage of discourse ethics is that it pro-
vides a means of discursive willformation in which the articulation 
of individual interests is possible. The communicatively compe-
tent participant in moral discourse can make his or her interests 
known in and through the process of argumentation. This osten-
sible advance beyond Kant is not, however, what it seems. 
Habermas' revision falls short in two ways. First, as Axel 
Honneth points out, if an individual or group is not comunicatively 
competent - i.e. not part of the bourgeois public sphere in one of 
the western liberal democracies - then their interests are not likely 
to be expressed in the process of discursive will formation. The 
type of moral discourse Habermas has in mind presupposes a so-
cial milieu permeated by enlightenment rationality. This tacit 
presupposition would presumably exclude many traditional cul-
tural groups as well as the vast majority of the working class, since 
these groups generally lack the capacity and means to express their 
interests through discourse. Consequently, the realization of prin-
ciple U will not be complete.33 
A second and even more obvious problem is the question of 
actually following out the implications of principle U. On the face 
of it, the assertion that all affected parties must be able to consent 
to the observance of a norm seems logistically impossible or at 
least highly improbable. If there are to be any norms at all, their 
establishment will be the result of some elision of principle U. 
Habermas accounts for this necessary inexactitude with principle 
D when he claims that valid norms meet or could meet the criteria 
established in U. However, this proviso is nothing more than the 
disguised presupposition of the interests of parties who are not able 
to directly express their interests themselves. The problem is that 
in either of these cases, despite that fact that a norm is constructed 
according to the principles of moral argumentation, a norm can be 
validated without the specific knowledge of interests of the affected 
parties that Habermas claims is required for the adoption of a norm 
and is the specific advantage of discourse ethics over Kant. The 
problem is not one of distorted communication or ideology but of 
the communicative hegemony of the bourgeois public sphere. 
The final point on which Habermas distinguishes his theory 
from Kant's has to do with the issue of justification. Habermas 
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contends that discourse ethics rectifies what he considers to be 
Kant's unsatisfactory appeal to the "fact of reason" by grounding 
the universal moral principle in the presuppositions of argumenta-
tion. For Habermas, when the "rules" of moral discourse are 
violated a "performative contradiction" results. 
But the opponent will have involved himself in a 
performative contradiction if the proponent can show 
that in making his argument, he has to make assump-
tions that are inevitable in any argumentation game 
aiming at critical examination and that the propositional 
content of those assumptions contradicts the principle 
of fallibilism.34 
Habermas claims that this inoculates discourse ethics against 
the ethical skeptic's attempt to demonstrate infinite regress, incom-
plete deduction, or circular argument in the establishment of 
principle U. In attempting to develop a refutation of U, the skeptic 
will be obliged to tacitly employ the very principles of argumenta-
tion she seeks to deny. Once again, Habermas' claim to have gone 
beyond Kant is only a matter of degree. 
Kant, like Habermas, explicitly grounds his ultimate moral 
norm in the principle of non-contradiction.35 For Kant, "the fact of 
reason" - viz. the reality of human freedom - is a principle that 
cannot be positively proven but which also cannot be denied with-
out the individual who denies it involving themselves in a 
contradiction.36 Kant asserts that it is contradictory to deny one's 
own moral vocation, that is, to deny ones own freedom and the 
moral consequences that follow from it. Although Kant didn't re-
fer to it as such, this contradiction is exactly what Habermas has in 
mind when he refers to a performative contradiction.37 For Kant 
the proposition "I am not free" is contradictory because the state-
ment contradicts what is presupposed by its very utterance. The 
speech-act or thought itself requires the agency of a speaker or 
thinker. When Habermas claims to have gone beyond Kant in his 
justification of the ultimate moral norm, he does so by not giving 
Kant full credit for his achievement. He contends that Kant merely 
asserts the categorical imperative when in fact Kant secures it 
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against the ethical skeptic in the same manner that he secures prin-
ciple U. 
Habermas might counter this claim with the assertion that 
Kant's employment of the concept of a performative contradiction 
already assumes a substantive moral content, human freedom and 
autonomy, while discourse ethics finds its starting point in a "tran-
scendental pragmatics of language" that avoids the inherent 
difficulties of Kant's assumption of freedom.38 Habermas points 
out that Kant can rightly be accused of petitioprincipi, yet he doesn't 
see that discourse ethics is no less susceptible to this charge.39 The 
articulation of a "transcendental pragmatics of language" and a 
commensurate "minimal logic" of moral argumentation presup-
poses argumentation as the most "exacting form of discourse" from 
the very beginning.40 This necessarily excludes other possible forms 
of communication that might possibly have normative import. In 
addition, as Habermas acknowledges, the question of exactly what 
constitutes such a "minimal logic" of argumentation remains an 
open question.41 
It has been my contention here that, rather than developing 
any really new moral perspective, Habermas' discourse ethics 
merely rethinks the basic tenets of Kant's ethical view and over-
lays them with speech-act theory. Habermas' appeal to 
"communicative competence" as a ground of morality begs the 
question no less than Kant's appeal to a "practical reason." Dis-
course ethics, by changing the assumptions, intends to be less 
parochial in its application and more open in its consideration of 
specific interests than the categorical imperative, but these new 
assumptions are equally monological and exclusionary. Finally, 
Habermas' appeal to the principle of non-contradiction, as justifi-
cation in the face of objections is directly inherited form Kant. 
Habermas' arguing from language use to rules for normative dis-
course begs the question no less than Kant's argument from the 
reality of human freedom to the categorical imperative. This is not 
to say that Habermas' articulation of the basic universalist position 
is not an advance over Kant's in terms of its theoretical formula-
tion, its social scientific detail, and its abandonment of metaphysics. 
Despite these modifications however, the basic elements of the po-
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sition, those feature's that elicited Hegel's strongest objections to 
Kant, remain the same. 
III. 
Thus far, I have attempted to explain the general ways in which 
the ethical theories of Kant and Habermas are alike; each is 
deontological, cognitivist, formalist, and universalist. I have also 
argued that Habermas is really not as different from Kant as he 
claims, particularly in regard to the manner in which he justifies 
his ultimate moral norm (viz. the appeal to contradiction). At this 
point, I wish to address the specific responses that Habermas makes 
to a Hegelian style critique of discourse ethics in his essay Moral-
ity and Ethical Life. Habermas recognizes Kant's separation of the 
problems of justification and application in regard to moral prin-
ciples as his singular achievement; however, this is exactly the point 
at which Hegel took Kant to task. 
Habermas first takes up Hegel's charge that the formalism of 
Kant's ethics is empty and that its pronouncements are no more 
than moral tautologies. Hegel contends, in the first few sentences 
of his critique of "Morality" in the Phenomenology, that one of the 
primary difficulties in Kant's view is that it denies Otherness (a 
similar critique is also undertaken by Hegel in the Philosophy of 
Right).42 The consciousness that knows duty as its absolute es-
sence "cannot receive the form of something alien" and is 
"completely locked up within itself; it behaves with perfect free-
dom and indifference towards this Otherness."43 The leading idea 
of Hegel's critique is that the "moral consciousness" articulated in 
Kant's practical philosophy must secure its freedom independently 
of the natural realm, which renders that freedom completely inde-
terminate and merely abstract. Duty is consistent with itself only 
by severing its ties to the world. Habermas concludes that Hegel 
was wrong to critique Kant in this way insofar as he implies that 
universal moral principles "postulate logical and semantic consis-
tency and nothing else." 4 4 However, Habermas acknowledges that 
Hegel was right to realize the inherent difficulties in the employ-
ment of non-contextual moral principles. 
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Habermas replies to the Hegelian critique on this point by as-
serting, "the content that is tested by a moral principle is generated 
not by the philosopher, but by real life."45 The problems that the 
universal moral principle must address are simply "given" as the 
starting point of any moral discourse. Conflicts between different 
normative validity claims simply arise in the course of human in-
teraction. For Habermas, these disputes can then be adjudicated in 
a public moral discourse according to the established rules for moral 
argumentation. 
This manner of meeting Hegel's objection, with its recourse to 
the given-ness of normative conflicts, fails because, on the one 
hand, it simply side-steps the central problem Habermas identi-
fies, and on the other, it is inconsistent with regard to the 
pre-established limits of the universal moral principle as a meta-
ethical principle employed to adjudicate between disputed norms. 
The categorical imperative is about testing maxims while principles 
U and D are about redeeming normative validity claims. Both the 
C.I. and principle U are meta-normative; they are not intended to 
proscribe or sanction particular actions. Principle U may uphold 
the validity of some particular norm, but it can't fully articulate 
just how such a norm should be implemented in a specific case. 
The question "Does the rule apply to 'this' case?" is a matter that 
cannot be decided by the rule itself. Moral judgment must come 
into play and some specific action must be taken. The consistency 
in this relationship is always between the meta-principle and the 
norm in question (an abstraction from contents) and not between 
the norm and the action it purports to govern. Hegel was right to 
point this out. 
Habermas realizes that the basis of Hegel's objection was the 
insight that, up to now in human history, there has been never been, 
in the words of Alasdair Maclntyre, "morality as such."46 The ques-
tion at issue for Hegel was whether or not moral rules could be 
constructed apart from some concretely articulated vision of the 
good. Hegel answered this question by asserting that moral prin-
ciples have always been and must necessarily be inextricably bound 
up in cultural frameworks that give them force and meaning. This 
is the essence of Hegel's idea of "ethical life" (Sittlichkeit). Ethi-
cal decision-making always depends on context. It depends on 
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inherited traditions and concrete historical realities. Universal moral 
principles must sacrifice their universality or remain content free 
in the Hegelian view. 
Habermas acknowledges these problems when he writes, "Non-
contextual definitions of a moral principle, I admit, have not been 
satisfactory up to now."47 History provides no examples of any 
moral viewpoint disengaged from a particular form of life. The 
general division between principles and actions is a problem for 
both Kant and Habermas, and it is one both thinkers recognize but 
nonetheless do not and cannot address. Hegel sumarizes his point 
of view somewhat sharply when he writes, in reference to Kant, 
The moral world-view is, therefore, in fact nothing other 
than the elaboration of this fundamental contradiction 
in its various aspects. It is, to employ here a Kantian 
expression where it is most appropriate, a 'whole nest 
of thoughtless contradictions.'4" 
Hegel's point is that the process that establishes an ultimate 
norm and the questions regarding its instantiation in particular cir-
cumstances are inextricably linked. The process of justification, 
whether it is carried out through recourse to the principle of non-
contradiction or by other means, cannot be disassociated from the 
question of application as both Kant and Habermas attempt. For 
Hegel, the questions of justification and application are insepa-
rable. Moral consciousness, because it fails to recognize the 
immanent relation between these two aspects of ethical life, must 
always remain duplicitous in its formulations. 
The second criticism of Kant that Habermas brings to the table 
and attempts to address is what he calls the "abstract universalism 
of morally justified judgment."49 Seyla Benhabib, another theorist 
with neo-Habermasian views, refers to this objection as the "insti-
tutional deficiency of Kantian moral theory."50 Hegel accuses Kant 
of dissemblance when he asserts, 
The moral self-consciousness is its own absolute, and 
duty is absolutely only what it knows as duty. ...(Moral 
self-consciousness) i.s not really in earnest about let-
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ting something be made sacred by another conscious-
ness than itself; forthat alone it holds to be sacred which 
it has itself made sacred, and is sacred in it.51 
Hegel points to the fact that what universalist moralities offer 
is not genuine pluralism, but an empty egalitarianism artificially 
constructed through a faceless equality. The selves bound by the 
moral law are, so to speak, ethical placeholders and not actual per-
sons. The universal ist principle must set itself up as the principle, 
and, insofar as it does, it is necessarily exclusionary. Again, 
Habermas both agrees and disagrees with the Hegelian diagnosis. 
Habermas disagrees with Hegel insofar as Hegel's criticism 
suggests that particular interests are necessarily impinged upon by 
universal moral principles. He argues that modern societies do 
require regulation and that such regulations will necessarily intro-
duce limitations. As long as compromise achieved through morally 
justified procedures is sought, then discursive consensus is unnec-
essary. On this much, it seems, Habermas and Hegel agree. 
Habermas admits, however, that moral judgments applied 
monologically, in the manner that Kant's theory conceives them, 
necessarily lead to situations that are exclusionary but he contends 
that discourse ethics inoculates itself against this possibility by 
building in a sensitivity to individuals interests. As I pointed out 
earlier, the universal expression of interests which Habermas claims 
saves him from Kant's monologism is only possible for voices that 
speak the language; those of the of western, liberal, bourgeois. 
Habermas' principles are no less hegemonic than Kant's. They too 
exclude their own Other from the discourse. 
Habermas notes that Hegel's critique points out the inherent 
limits of any theory of morality that follows the Kantian model. 
Such theories, in order to make general claims, must omit many of 
the details. "They focus on questions of justification, leaving ques-
tion of application unanswered."52 Habermas concedes that Hegel 
is correct about the limits of universalistic moralities but that it is 
wrong to adopt the neo-Aristotilian solution, which advocates a 
contextually conditioned faculty of judgment, to this difficulty. 
Habermas claims "Kant's achievement was precisely to dissociate 
the problem of justification from the application and implementa-
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tion of moral insights." On the other hand, Hegel's whole point is 
that this dissociation is harmful rather than helpful (Hegel actually 
advocates a Hegelian faculty of judgement which attempts to move 
dialectically from contexts to a view of the whole). 5 3 The division 
between justification and implementation remains a sticking point 
for universalist ethical theories and Hegel's contention is that one 
problem can't be resolved independently of the other. 
The third criticism that Habermas discusses is Hegel's idea 
that the division between the sensuous and the intelligible in Kant 
undermines the practical impact of his moral philosophy. Habermas 
refers to this as the "impotence of the 'Ought." 5 4 He concurs with 
Hegel's criticism of Kant, but claims that discourse ethics escapes 
this charge since it secures itself through the presuppositions of 
argumentation. As I have already shown, however, Habermas' ref-
ormation of Kant doesn't really eliminate this division, but dresses 
it up in new clothes that conceal its inner contradictions. Habermas 
covers over this problem with his equivocal theory of communica-
tive competence. He concedes that Hegel is correct in asserting 
that a universalist practical discourse must, necessarily, disconnect 
practical problems from their contexts, but he adds the proviso that 
this is only for the greater good that a re-integration of discursively 
established norms into their life-world contexts offer. Habermas 
argues that disparate forms of life "must meet universalist morali-
ties half-way" in order to solve the problems brought about by the 
instrumental rationalization of the life-world. However, this "meet-
ing halfway" most certainly involves a denaturation of those forms 
of life that can only be questioned after the fact.55 The progressive 
rationalization of the life-world closes off the possibility of a 
"hermeneutic" perspective, which recognizes the autonomy and 
legitimacy of other forms of life. Habermas calls for the sacrifice 
of traditional moralities while offering no guarantee but a Utopian 
faith in the power of discourse to mitigate deeply entrenched prac-
tical problems. Hegel's own view of ethical life embodies a similar 
hope for the mediating power of dialogue without, however, put-
ting participating traditions at stake. 
The last dimension of the Hegelian critique of Kant that 
Habermas addresses is the notion that universal ist moralities lead 
to totalitarian political regimes. Habermas argues that such results 
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are not in accord with the spirit or letter of either Kantianism or 
discourse ethics, however, it is nonetheless the case that universal-
ist moralities presuppose a totalizing ideology - the ideology of 
universal rationality. This type of objection is not one that Hegel 
levels explicitly against Kant, but one that can be inferred from his 
critique. The idea of liberal democracy, inherited from Locke and 
completed the in greatest minds of the enlightenment became the 
ideal that the French revolution was an attempt to realize by force. 
Discourse ethics too has as its final goal the realization of the free-
dom of every individual through a homogenization of interests. 
Habermas explicitly endorses this goal: 
Universalist moralities are dependent on forms of life 
that are rationalized in that they make possible the pru-
dent application of universal moral insights and support 
motivations for translating insights into moral action. 
Only those forms of life that meet universalist morali-
ties halfway in this sense fulfill the conditions necessary 
to reverse the abstractive achievements of 
decontextualization and demotivation.56 
Discourse ethics is unable to meet non-rationalized life-worlds 
on their own terms. To the extent that discourse ethics requires 
and seeks to perpetuate the rationalization of forms of life which 
otherwise would be unable to participate and articulate their inter-
ests, it is totalitarian. It is unable to afford those forms of life 
recognition (Anerkennug) in any but its own terms. 
In conclusion, I wish to summarize my argument. Since the 
differences between Kant and Habermas are only superficial, 
Hegel's criticisms of Kant apply equally to Habermas. By con-
trasting Habermas' conception of the moral intuitions of discourse 
ethics with the concrete moral situation that Hegel reveals in the 
Phenomenology, some of the inherent limitations of discourse eth-
ics, and universalist ethical theories in general, are revealed. To 
review; first, the separation of justification and application that a 
universalist ethics requires from the outset, renders it unable to 
achieve any reconciliation between these elements without recourse 
to dissemblance (i.e. hiding the separation). Second, the univer-
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salist position excludes all otherness in theory and, consequently, 
is inevitably exclusionary in practice. Hegel's critique of Kant 
reveals the immanent contradiction between the two professed aims 
of discourse ethics; the establishment of an ultimate principle to 
adjudicate between contested norms and the establishment of truly 
egalitarian social arrangements. Third, Hegel's critique of Kant's 
two-view points doctrine is not overcome by Habermas' reliance 
on communication theory to ground principle U. Habermas' theory 
of communicative competence is a dual-aspect theory of the same 
stripe as Kant's. Finally, the incapacity of the Kantian moralist to 
recognize his other is also present in discourse ethics and is the 
necessary pre-condition for totalitarianism. 
In general, the failures of Kant's moral theory that are repeated 
in Habermas' discourse ethics are not so much the result of 
Habermas' misreading of Hegel's specific criticisms of Kant, but 
of his failure to understand Hegel's view of language. Habermas 
understands the "linguistic turn" in western philosophy as a post-
Hegelian development rooted in Anglo-American analytic 
scholarship, the social sciences, and speech-act theory. It was Hegel, 
however, who, through his critiques of Kant and the Romantics 
exposed the inherent limitations of the "philosophy of conscious-
ness" paradigm and emphasized the significance of language and 
its role as the medium of recognition in ethical life. 
Habermas claims that he is following Hegel insofar as discourse 
ethics aims at the same reconciliation that Hegel sought between, 
on the one hand, individual rights and the principle of justice, and, 
on the other, the integrity of the community and the principle of 
solidarity.57 Such an ideal relation, Habermas assents, is embodied 
in Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit. For both Habermas and Hegel, 
this ideal is realized in language, but it is realized in very different 
conceptions of language. Comparison of the following statements, 
the first by Habermas and the second by Hegel, brings the contrast 
in their respective views of language into sharp relief. Habermas' 
view of language stems from the approach necessarily taken by 
Understanding (following Kant's use of this term). 
There is only one reason why discourse ethics, which 
presumes to derive the substance of universalistic mo-
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rality from the general presuppositions of argumenta-
tion, is a promising strategy: discourse or argumentation 
is a more exacting type of communication, going be-
yond any particular form of life. Discourse generalizes, 
abstracts, and stretches the presuppositions of context-
bound communicative actions by extending their range 
to include competent subjects beyond the provincial 
limits of their own particular form of life.58 
Hegel, in contrast, speaking from the standpoint of Reason (fol-
lowing Hegel's use of this term), writes, 
Here again, then, we see language as the existence of 
Spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing/or oth-
ers, self-consciousness which, as such is immediately 
present, and this self-consciousness is universal... It 
perceives itself just as it is perceived by others, and the 
perceiving is just existence which has become a self.59 
Hegel's view holds out for a richer view of language that is not 
simply reducible to the presuppositions of argumentation, a form 
of language constitutive of the self and concrete. He explains the 
Kantian view by way of contrast with his own. 
Moral consciousness, on the other hand, is still dumb, 
shut up with itself within its inner life, for there the self 
does not as yet have an existence: existence and the 
self stand as yet only in an external relation to each 
other. Language, however, only emerges as the middle 
term, mediating between independent and acknowl-
edged self-consciousnesses; and the existent self is 
immediately universal acknowledgment...60 
For Hegel, the self, the individual moral agent, is not possible 
in the abstract. Language that only abstracts does not perform its 
most essential function of publicly constituting the self. The ex-
acting language of discourse that Habermas prescribes as the 
antidote to the most recalcitrant contemporary moral conflicts fails 
to include language's expressive function, which Hegel understood 
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as essential to the attainment of the ethical goal of mutual recogni-
tion. Language that ardently eschews contradiction fails to grasp 
the dialectical nature of thought and language. It cannot perform 
its function as the medium of recognition. For Hegel, the self, as a 
universal, is constituted by the particular details of its context and 
history. In Hegel's view, it is only with the full cognizance of the 
details of the individuals involved that moral dialogue, rather than 
mere moral argument, can be carried out. 
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